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In the last four or so decades Western societies have experienced large increases in
migration inﬂows, and the immigrant population in the OECD countries has more
than tripled since the 1960s. Ethnic riots in the current decade1 have promoted
lively discussion on how governments can deal with the rising levels of diversity, and
what are the best frameworks to regulate the social status of newcomers and their
descendants and promote their integration with the local community.
The legal institution of citizenship has frequently been a key issue in political and
cultural debates on immigration, welfare programs, multiculturalism, and national-
ism. However, there is no evidence on whether the attribution of formal citizenship
has an eﬀect on how immigrants and ethnic groups identify themselves within host
country societies. More generally, it is unclear whether migration policies help to
foster social cooperation within society, and avoid the divisiveness of racial, religious,
and ethnic aﬃliation.
Citizenship laws vary across countries and over time,2 but they generally fall into
two main groups based on the principles underlying the possibility to be granted
citizenship at birth: jus sanguinis (“right of blood”), and jus soli (“right of soil”)
or birthright citizenship. According to the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship is de-
termined by having an ancestor who is citizen of the country. Under the jus soli
principle instead, citizenship is granted to any individual born in the territory of the
related country. The United States historically has adopted a very inclusive approach
and the melting-pot metaphor is often used to describe its successful assimilation of
non-natives. While in the United States the jus soli was encoded in the Constitution
and has never been changed, in Europe rules on citizenship are characterized by a
mix of jus soli and jus sanguinis and are often subject to debate and revision. In 1984
the British Nationality Act restricted the jus soli in the UK; in 1999 a new citizenship
law injected some elements of jus soli into the German jus sanguinis system.
This paper studies how the introduction of the birthright citizenship for children
born in Germany to non-German citizen parents aﬀects the degree of parental inte-
1Outbreaks of social unrest occurred in towns in the north of England in 2001 and in Paris
suburbs in 2005 and 2006.
2Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) provide empirical evidence on how economic, legal and cultural
variables aﬀected the evolution of citizenship laws in the post-world war period.
2gration with the local community measured by the probability of visiting and being
visited by Germans, and the propensity to speak in German and read German news-
papers. While the ﬁrst two variables proxy for the willingness to interact with the
local population, the latter two measure proxy for the level of acquaintance with local
culture. In May 1999, the German parliament amended the Citizenship and Nation-
ality Law of 1913. Under the original law, a child born in Germany was granted
German citizenship if at least one parent had German citizenship at the time of its
birth. The reform introduced elements of the birthright citizenship system: a child
born to foreign parents on 1st January 2000 or after was eligible for citizenship at
birth if a) at least one parent had been ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years
and b) had been granted a permanent right of residence. The law also introduced
a transitional provision for the children of foreign residents, aged under age 10 on
1st January 2000. These children would be naturalized upon application (to be com-
pleted before the 31st of December 2000) if at least one parent had been ordinarily
resident in Germany for 8 years at the time of their birth.
In order to avoid potential problems of endogeneity related to the child bearing
decisions of immigrants, and variations over time in the composition of immigrants’
inﬂows, we identify the eﬀect of the regulatory framework of child citizenship by ex-
ploiting the retrospective component of the 1999 German reform. Among households
composed of foreign parents whose youngest child was born in Germany between 1990
and 1999, only those where at least one of the parents had resided in Germany for more
than 8 years at the time of its birth were aﬀected by the reform. In the terminology
of the evaluation literature this represents the treatment group. All households where
the youngest child was born between 1980 and 1989, or where parents had stayed
for less than 8 years when the youngest child was born between 1990 and 1999, are
the control group. Using data from the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP), a
household-based panel survey that over samples immigrants, and comparing the inte-
gration outcomes of parents in the treatment and control groups before and after the
reform, we investigate how the legal framework of child citizenship can aﬀect parental
integration.
Our results show that the introduction of jus soli citizenship determines a signif-
icant and not negligible increase in the probability of socializing (visiting and being
visited by) with Germans, and reading German newspapers. We then investigate
3whether the eﬀect of the birthright citizenship system on parental integration varies
with the parental level of human capital, measured by the number of years of educa-
tion, and level of integration of the community to which they belong. The Turkish
community, while being the largest ethnic group in Germany, has consistently dis-
played lower levels of integration than among other foreign communities. We ﬁnd that
the eﬀect of the reform on the level of interaction with the local community is inde-
pendent of whether or not the respondent belongs to the Turkish group, but that the
reform increased the propensity to speak German and read German newspapers only
among non-Turkish immigrants. Interestingly, we also found that the respondents’
level of human capital produced diﬀerent patterns of integration after the reform:
poorly educated respondents’ interactions with the local community increased after
the reform, while for the better educated respondents the level of integration with
local culture increased.
A number of robustness checks support the causality of the link between child
legal status and immigrants’ integration. We use a semiparametric diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences approach and perform falsiﬁcation tests in order to exclude the possibility
that our results are driven by diﬀerential trends between the treatment and control
groups. Possible selection biases are discussed and controlled for. Finally, the sample
is opportunely restricted in order to rule out confounding eﬀects driven by other of
the provisions of the new citizenship law.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work to provide a quantitative assessment of
the eﬀects of policies on immigrants’ levels of integration. So far, scholars have de-
voted little attention to what determines immigrants’ levels of cultural assimilation.
Diﬃculties to integrate can potentially contribute to explain some of the persistent
diﬀerences between natives and non-natives, i.e. fertility rates and school perfor-
mance.3 Our results suggest that migration policies might play an important role
in explaining some of these diﬀerences. Moreover, in showing that the regulatory
framework of child legal status can signiﬁcantly aﬀect parental behavior, we provide
evidence that migration rules can have indirect eﬀects on individuals other than those
directly targeted by policy.
3Algan et al. (2010), when studying the educational attainments of natives and immigrants
in France, Germany and UK, ﬁnd that the gap of second-generation immigrants is smaller than
ﬁrst-generation ones, but still signiﬁcant in each of the three countries.
4This paper is related to the large economic literature on migration developed in
the past two decades. As stressed by Borjas and Hilton (1996), the historical debate
over immigration policy, especially in the US, has focused primarily on two issues:
1) how well immigrants integrate in the native community; and 2) whether or not
the presence of immigrants aﬀects the labor market outcomes of natives. While the
economic literature mainly addresses the second issue,4 there is very little evidence on
the determinants of immigrants’ integration processes. We consider the 1999 German
nationality law reform and present evidence that changes in the rules that regulate
child legal status have increased the level of parental integration with German society,
as measured by the extent to which they use the local language, and the level of social
interactions with the native community. Language proﬁciency has been shown to be
positively correlated with earnings (see, among others, Chiswick (1991), Angrist and
Lavy (1997) and Dustmann and Van Soest (2002)), while Bertrand et al. (2000)
provide evidence that networks involving only the socially disadvantaged can inhibit
upward mobility. Borjas (1992) argues that intergenerational transmission of skills
and earnings among immigrants depends on parental input as well as on the quality of
the ethnic environment, the so called ethnic capital. He provides evidence suggesting
that the quality of the ethnic environment acts as an externality in the human capital
accumulation process and partially explains persistent diﬀerences between natives
and non-natives. Therefore, policies that facilitate the integration of immigrants
might aﬀect ethnic capital, and thus promote intergenerational mobility and foster
convergence with the levels of natives.5
We also contribute to the literature on the determinants of ethnic assimilation
and identiﬁcation. Bisin et al. (2006) ﬁnd that in the UK, ethnic identity is more in-
tense in mixed than in segregated neighborhoods, Clots-Figueras and Masella (2008)
argue that the introduction of bilingual education in Catalonia in 1983 had an eﬀect
on the identity of Catalan residents and on their political preferences. Indeed, the
level of usage of the German language and the extent of interactions with German
4The existing evidence on the eﬀects of migration on natives’ labor outcomes is not conclusive.
Borjas (2003) ﬁnds that the presence of immigrants lowers the wages for competing workers. Otta-
viano and Peri (2008) provide evidence of complementarities between local and immigrant workers,
showing that, in the long run, migration has a small positive eﬀect on the wages of natives.
5Mazzolari (2009) ﬁnds that dual citizenship rights have a positive eﬀect on the economic as-
similation of immigrants in the United States. Steinhardt (2008) documents that the acquisition of
citizenship is associated with a positive wage premium in Germany.
5citizens might be interpreted as a measure of self-identiﬁcation with the host coun-
try. We focus on citizenship laws and isolate another possible determinant of ethnic
identiﬁcation: the legal status of the children.
Finally, by focussing on the eﬀect of child status on parental integration, we also
contribute to a recent stream of literature that studies how the characteristics of
the children can aﬀect parental behavior. The current literature tends to emphasize
the eﬀects of child gender on parental choices and preferences.6 This paper provides
evidence that legal status is another way through which children can aﬀect parental
outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of cit-
izenship systems across the world, and of the reform studied here. Data, empirical
strategy, basic empirical evidence and the possible channels through which the citi-
zenship rights of the children might have an eﬀect on parental behavior are discussed
in Section 3. Section 4 provides several robustness checks. Section 5 looks at the
heterogeneous eﬀects of the German reform. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Background on Citizenship Laws
2.1 Jus Sanguinis vs. Jus Soli
In this section we provide an overview of the legal framework of citizenship and
some descriptive evidence on the link between citizenship systems and immigrant
integration. While both the beneﬁts associated with citizenship and the rules that
regulate its acquisition vary across countries, for the purpose of our analysis we keep
the discussion in this section general. Historical information on the evolution of
citizenship systems largely draws on Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010).
Citizenship is the legal institution that assigns full membership in a state and
determines associated rights and duties. There are diﬀerent ways to achieve citizen-
ship: through birth, by naturalization, by adoption, and by marriage. Citizenship at
6Dahl and Moretti (2008) show that the child gender has an impact on the living arrangements,
marital status and reproduction decisions of a signiﬁcant fraction of American families. Washington
(2008) ﬁnds that the number of daughters increases the propensity of US male congressmen to
vote liberally, particularly on reproductive rights issues; similarly, Oswald and Powdthavee (2006)
describe how the preferences towards political parties in the UK are driven by the proportion of
oﬀspring who are girls.
6birth determines the legal position of second generation immigrants. In most cases
citizenship provides the right to vote, the right to run for public oﬃce, the possibility
to travel without restrictions and to obtain visas for relatives, and legal protection in
the case of a criminal charge. There may be additional beneﬁts in the form of a wider
range of public beneﬁts and better employment opportunities. On the other hand,
citizenship status often implies costs such as the military draft and renunciation of
original citizenship. A broader set of monetary and non-monetary costs is associated
with the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization. For example, those applying for
naturalization are required not only to pay some administrative charges and taxes,
but in many cases also need to take language and culture tests, spend time queuing
at registration oﬃces, and avoid any activities that might determine disqualiﬁcation.
Citizenship laws should be seen as constituting parts of broader migration policies.
However, as stressed by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010), while other measures (i.e.
quotas and visa requirements) tend to change in response to short term contingencies
(economic conditions and current government orientation above all), citizenship laws
are the outcome of long term and complex processes that often require constitutional
changes. The rules that determine the acquisition of citizenship in most cases reﬂect
the interplay between a country’s legal origins and the historical process.
In the 18th century jus soli was the dominant rule in Europe as a result of the
feudal tradition that linked the individual to the lord of the manor in whose conﬁnes
the individual was born. The French revolution marked a clear discontinuity with this
tradition and the reintroduction of the principle based on the right of descent that
was central in the ancient Roman system. During the 19th century the jus sanguinis
principle was adopted throughout Europe and was extended by most countries to their
colonies with the notable exception of Britain;7 jus sanguinis regulated citizenship
law in most civil law countries while jus soli was the norm in common law countries.
By the end of the 19th century, a dramatic sequence of historical events led to a
continuous process of transformation of the citizenship laws throughout the world.8
After the Revolution experience, in 1889 France reintroduced the jus soli mainly in
order to include the sons of immigrants in the draft.9 After progressive tightening
7The British maintained the jus soli principle and applied it in all their colonies, starting with
the US, which later encoded it in the constitution.
8More detailed analysis can be found in Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010), Joppke (1999).
9After long and lively debate, in 1993, the Chirac government introduced a restrictive revision
7of the criteria in Britain, following the postwar mass colonial migration, in 1984 the
British Nationality Act restricted the jus soli by establishing that a child born in the
UK qualiﬁed for British citizenship only if at least one parent was a British citizen
or resident. Legislation along similar lines, based on the jus soli, was in place in
Australia until 1986, after which time a child born in Australia needed at least one
parent who was either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident in order to be
granted citizenship.
Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) in their study of the determinants of citizenship
rules compiled a data set of the citizenship laws in 162 world countries and classiﬁed
each country according to the principle regulating access to citizenship at birth as
recorded in three diﬀerent years after World War II: 1948, 1975, and 2001. They
organize countries into three groups: 1) jus sanguinis; 2) mixed regime; 3) jus soli.
The mixed regime categories include all those countries where the system includes
elements of jus soli and jus sanguinis.10
As a preliminary step in understanding the relationship between type of citizen-
ship system and level of immigrants’ integration, we provide cross country evidence
based on the data obtained by merging the Bertocchi and Strozzi database with the
World Values Survey (WVS). The fourth wave of the WVS collects information on
the socio-cultural and political attitudes and beliefs of 76,303 individuals in 53 coun-
tries. Unlike previous waves, the fourth wave reports speciﬁc information on both
parents’ country of birth. In order to achieve the largest possible sample within each
country (the number of individuals surveyed by the WVS in each country is typically
very small), we consider both ﬁrst and second generation immigrants, as deﬁned by
whether both parents were born abroad. In this way we consider individuals who have
been directly aﬀected by the citizenship system or whose children might have been
aﬀected. In order to measure the level of integration we report evidence on two types
of outcomes: language usage and participation in social activities. Respondents were
of the criteria for citizenship, which required formal citizenship requests from second-generation
immigrants. In 1997, these restrictions were considerably revised by the left-wing government, to
allow automatic assignment of citizenship at 18, to the children of immigrants born in France, who
had neither requested, nor declined citizenship.
10According to the evidence presented by the authors, in 1948 jus sanguinis was the dominant
principle in 41% of countries, while jus soli was the rule in about 47%, with the remaining 12% with
mixed regimes. By 2001, 54% of the 162 countries had adopted jus sanguinis regimes, 24% relied on
a jus soli system and 22% had mixed regimes.
8asked what language was normally spoken at home and based on this information we
constructed a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the language spoken at home
by the individual was the main language spoken in the country, and 0 otherwise. We
deﬁne the main language as the language spoken by at least 50% of the population,
as measured by the index of linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al. (2003)).11 The
measure of involvement in social activities is based on participation in the following:
1) church or religious organization; 2) sport or recreational organization; 3) art, mu-
sic, or educational organization; 3) labor union; 4) political party; 5) environmental
organization; 6) professional association; 7) humanitarian or charitable organization;
8) consumer organization. We deﬁne a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
individual participates in at least one of these activities, and 0 otherwise. Later in
the paper we rely on measures of interaction with natives, however, this information
is not available in the WVS. Figure 1 shows that in countries where the jus sanguinis
is in place around 65% of ﬁrst and second generation immigrants speak the main
language of the country, at home. The percentage is slightly higher in those countries
where there is a system that combines jus sanguinis and jus soli, while it is around
77% in countries where the jus soli system is in place. Consistently, while less than
50% of ﬁrst and second generation immigrants in jus sanguinis countries are involved
in at least one social activity, the percentage is around 70% in the other two groups
of countries.
2.2 The German Reform
In May 1999, the German Parliament amended the Citizenship and Nationality Law
of 1913. The reform had three main elements:
• introduction of jus soli citizenship;
• changes to naturalization criteria;
• denial of dual citizenship.
11We rule out of the sample South Africa, India, Zambia, Indonesia, and Mali as there is no
language that is spoken by at least 50% of the population. The ﬁnal sample consists of 1,681
individuals in 44 countries.
9Before the reform, a child born in Germany was granted German citizenship if
at least one of the parents was a German citizen at the time of its birth.12 Under
the new regime, elements of the jus soli system were introduced. A child born in
Germany to foreign parents on 1st January 2000 or after is granted citizenship at
birth if: a) at least one parent has been ordinarily resident in Germany for eight
years and b) has been granted permanent right of residence. The law also introduced
a transitional provision for those foreigner residents in Germany under the age of
10 on 1st January 2000. They would be granted naturalization upon application (to
be completed before 31st December 2000) if at least one parent had been ordinarily
resident in Germany for 8 years when the child was born. Moreover, the child would
be allowed dual citizenship until the age of 23, at which age it would be necessary to
choose whether to retain German citizenship and renounce former citizenship (known
as the Optionmodell).
Unlike the citizenship at birth provision, the naturalization policy for adults had
been subject to a series of changes in the years before the reform. There were laws
aﬀecting naturalization applications passed in 1990 and 1993. These changes were
introduced to limit the discretion of oﬃcials to deny naturalization and to provide
foreigners with the legal right to claim entitlement to naturalization; the 1990 law, in
particular, established that foreigners between 16 and 23 years of age with 8 or more
years of residency, and foreigners above the age of 23 with a minimum of 15 years
of residency, had a legal claim to naturalization. The law approved in 1999 involved
further changes to the naturalization criteria: it introduced a minimum residency
requirement of 8 years without any age restriction and replaced the legal entitlement
to naturalization with certain requirements such as expressing loyalty to the German
Constitution, being able to support oneself and one’s family without social security or
unemployment beneﬁts, a clean criminal record, adequate command of the German
language and renunciation of previous citizenship.
Finally, the law passed in 1999 by the German Parliament includes an explicit
denial of dual citizenship. Pre-reform, dual citizenship was not legally recognized
and Anil (2006) reports anecdotal evidence suggesting that the German oﬃcialdom
was generally unwilling to tolerate the idea of dual citizenship.
12In the case that only the father was a citizen, citizenship was dependent on the recognition or
determination of paternity under the German law.
10According to Thomsen et al. (2008), in 2005 one ﬁfth of the population had
an immigration background - i.e. they either had migrated to Germany themselves
or were descendants of former immigrants - and among them 47% possessed foreign
citizenship. Our empirical analysis will consider immigrants who were not citizens
when the citizenship reform was approved and test how the reform’s transitional
provision changes their incentives to integrate with native Germans. Those targeted
by the transitional provision include individuals who had not exerted their right to
become German citizens, gained by meeting the residency requirements described
above. It is therefore necessary to discuss: 1) the reasons why eligible parents did not
apply for German citizenship; 2) why the incentives for citizenship might be more
important for their children.
Guest workers who arrived in Germany during the 1960s and the 1970s were
encouraged by their home governments to maintain ties with their home countries
in order to guarantee ﬂows of remittances.13 Because of the German denial of dual
citizenship, immigrants had to relinquish their citizenship in order to become German
citizens. However, for many years emigrants who decided to renounce their citizenship
of origin faced various restrictions in their home country. For instance, as reported by
Mueller (2006), until 1996 Turkish regulations deprived individuals of property rights
in Turkey if they abandoned Turkish citizenship. While children born to immigrants
in Germany will be more likely to have less strong ties with the home country of
their parents, it should be noted that under the new citizenship system introduced in
Germany they can enjoy dual citizenship (and its beneﬁts) up to the age of 23, when
they are required to make a choice. Therefore, by taking advantage of the transitional
component, foreign born parents can enable their children to have an extended period
to choose which country’s citizenship rights they prefer.
The economic beneﬁts of citizenship are supposed to be higher for children than
for parents. In fact, citizenship rights should matter more when agents enter the labor
market rather than later when the relevant skills and experience have already been
acquired. Among ﬁrst generation immigrants, relinquishing birth country citizenship
might also imply some psychological costs; these costs are likely to be much lower for
13Sayary (1986) reports that Turkish migrants were encouraged to remit their savings through
the oﬀer of special interest rates for foreign currency savings accounts in Turkey and by certain
privileges related to the import of goods.
11their children who were born, and have grown up and completed their schooling in
Germany. Finally, parents able to apply for citizenship for their children under the
transitional regime might do so in anticipation of higher naturalization costs in the
future as the result of the new provisions.
Finding measures for those who might have potentially taken advantage of the
transitional provision of the reform and those who actually applied is impossible:
the GSOEP provides information only on parents but not children’s citizenship, and,
to the best of our knowledge, this information is not obtainable from other survey
data. However, we do have data on number of naturalizations by birth cohort which
provides indirect evidence on the extent to which non-citizen immigrants exploit the
transitional clause in the reform. Figure 2 plots for each year in the time interval
between 1999 and 2002 the fraction of naturalizations granted to individuals born
between 1990 and 1999 (including those who could potentially beneﬁt from the tran-
sitional component of the reform) over the total number of naturalizations granted in
that year, compared to the fraction of naturalizations granted to those born between
1980 and 1989, none of whom are eligible under the transitional scheme. The graph
shows that in the year before the reform, the number of naturalizations for each of
the two cohorts accounted for approximately 15% of all the naturalizations granted in
that year. There is a sharp increase in the number of naturalizations for individuals
born between 1990 and 1999 during the time window when parents were allowed to
apply for citizenship.14 As a result, in 2000 and 2001, the fraction of naturalizations
for those born between 1990 and 1999 over the total number of naturalizations is
almost double than that for those born between 1980 and 1989 and it accounts for
about one fourth of the total number of naturalizations conceded in that year. In
2002, the two groups display the same fraction of naturalizations.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy and Econometric Method
The objective of our empirical analysis is to identify whether introduction of the
jus soli system has an eﬀect on the level of integration of foreign born parents. We
14The time lag is usually 1 year between the application and registration as a citizen.
12exploit the retrospective provision in the 1999 citizenship reform which allows foreign
born parents without German citizenship, to naturalize all children born in Germany
between 1990 and 1999 subject to the requirement the parents had been resident in
Germany for at least 8 years before the child was born.
By exploiting the retrospective component of the reform we rule out two potential
sources of endogeneity. First, in deciding whether to have a child or not foreign
born individuals might potentially be aﬀected by the regulatory changes that became
eﬀective with the reform. Second, the composition of the migrant population might
change after the reform since potential incomers might be attracted by the fact that,
under the new regime, any children born to them would have full German citizenship.
In our context, foreign citizen parents who had resided for at least 8 years in Ger-
many when the youngest child was born between 1990 and 1999 represent the treat-
ment group. The control group includes all foreign citizen parents whose youngest
child was born in Germany between 1980 and 1989, or who had been resident in
Germany for less than 8 years when their youngest child was born in Germany in the
period 1990 to 1999.15 By comparing the integration outcomes of the treatment and
control groups before and after the reform, we are able to capture the eﬀect of the
provision that introduces jus soli citizenship on parental integration.
Since the treatment group includes all those individuals who were oﬀered the
possibility to apply for their children’s citizenship, irrespective of whether or not
they did so, our strategy identiﬁes the eﬀect of eligibility to apply, the so called
intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀect. The main advantage of this strategy relies in the
possibility to control for the potential selection issues inherent in the decision to
apply for citizenship.16
In order to test formally how the introduction of jus soli citizenship aﬀects parental
integration, we estimate the following diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) model:
Yijt = β0 + β1Tj + β2Dt + β3Tj ∗ Dt + γ
′
Xijt + µt + uijt (1)
where Yijt is the integration outcome of parent i living in household j at time t. Tj
15The sample size would be too small if the control group were restricted only to parents resident
in Germany for less than 8 years.
16The ITT is smaller than the average causal eﬀect for those parents who actually took advantage
of the transitional scheme to naturalize their children.
13is the treatment dummy that is equal to 1 if in household j, between 1st January 1990
and 31st December 1999, at least one parent had lived in Germany for more than 8
years when the youngest child was born, and is equal to 0 if the foreign born parents
youngest child was born between 1980 and 1989, or they had been resident for less
than 8 years when the youngest child was born between 1990 and 1999. The dummy
Dt takes the value 1 for the surveys after the reform was passed in Parliament (May
1999), and 0 otherwise.
Xijt includes a full set of individual and household characteristics. In particular,
since we will show in the next section that treatment and control groups diﬀer in age,
we estimate two alternative speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst we control linearly for age,
in the second we allow for non-linear age eﬀects by including single year age dum-
mies. Additional controls include gender, household head status, years of education,
dummies for number of years living in Germany, number of children, marital status,
and household income deciles. Since the speed of the integration process might vary
according to immigrants’ origins, we include country of origin dummies in both spec-
iﬁcations. A full set of year dummies, µt, controls for time speciﬁc shocks aﬀecting
all individuals in the time interval covered by our analysis.
The main parameter of interest is β3 which identiﬁes the average causal eﬀect of the
introduction of jus soli citizenship on parental integration. In the main speciﬁcation
standard errors are clustered at the individual level in order to account for individual
shocks which are correlated over time.
The key identifying assumption relies on the fact that integration trends would be
the same for both the treatment and control groups in the absence of treatment. In
section 4.1 we test whether there are diﬀerential time trends that potentially could
explain our results.
At each period in time our sample includes only foreign born parents who are
not German citizens.17 Given the panel nature of our dataset this restriction might
potentially determine two sources of sample attrition. First, individuals might become
citizens and exit the sample.18 Second, individuals might exit from the sample to
17Questions on language used and social interactions were addressed only to foreign born respon-
dents who were not German citizens.
18As already mentioned, the criteria to apply for citizenship after 2000 remained the same for
individuals who had lived in Germany for less than 8 years. A priori it is not clear whether the
reform increased the cost of becoming a citizen for those who had been in Germany for more than
8 years.
14return to their home countries. As sources of attrition might vary diﬀerentially for
the treatment and control groups,19 in section 4.2 we use diﬀerent strategies to control
for this potential bias. Finally, in section 4.3 we restrict the sample in order to rule
out confounding eﬀects driven by other of the provisions of the new citizenship law.
3.2 Data and Descriptives
The main data source for our analysis is the GSOEP, which is the longest-running
longitudinal survey of private households and persons in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. It started in 1984 and there are 21 waves currently available. This survey
provides representative micro-data on individuals and households. Most importantly,
it oversamples migrants.20 The data therefore are unique in providing continuous in-
formation on a large sample of immigrants over a long period of time. Each individual
in the relevant household, aged over 15 is interviewed. The household head provides
information on children under 15. Individuals who have left the household to set up
on their own are tracked and included in the panel.
The dataset contains detailed information on country of origin and arrival date
of immigrants, and family composition. Crucial for our analysis, is that foreign born
individuals are asked about their citizenship status. This allows us to construct a
data set of foreign born, non-citizen parents, with at least one child born in Germany
in the time period 1980-1999, and to deﬁne the treatment and the control groups as
speciﬁed in the previous section. In order to make our treatment and control groups
more homogeneous in terms of observable characteristics, in the main analysis we
restrict our sample to those households where both parents were born after 1950.
Our main speciﬁcation considers only surveys after 1993 in order to avoid possible
confounding eﬀects due to the changes in the naturalization policies enacted in 1990
and 1993.
As expected, individuals living in treated households on average are younger than
those in control households (34 vs. 40 years), as shown in Table 1 which reports the
socio-demographic characteristics of the two groups elicited in the 1999 survey, the
19Results in Dustmann (2001) for Germany suggest that the probability of returning home in-
creases with age.
20Questionnaires for migrant households are available in native languages . This rules out potential
sample selection problems due to diﬀerential response rates.
15year prior the implementation of the reform we consider. Consistent with the age
diﬀerence, individuals in the control group have lived for longer in Germany and have
higher annual earnings. However, diﬀerences are statistically not signiﬁcant and, as
shown in column (4) of Table 1, become negligible when we control for single year age
dummies. These results are reassuring as they boost conﬁdence in the assumption
that the control group represents a valid counterfactual of the treatment group, after
accounting for age diﬀerences.
Table 2 reports the average levels of integration for the treatment and control
groups before and after the reform. Respondents were asked whether, in the previous
year, they had visited Germans in their homes and if they had received a visit from
Germans.21 We convert the answers to these two questions into two dummy variables,
respectively Visited Germans and Visited by Germans. Before the reform, on average
77% of the individuals in the control group had made visits to German homes as
opposed to 69% of those in the treatment group. After the reform, the percentage
for the control group is virtually the same, but it increases by about 3 percentage
points among those in the treatment group. Around 82% of the control group had
received Germans in their homes both before and after the reform. Among those in
the treatment group there is a sharp increase in the post reform period, with the
percentage of those who received visits from German citizens increasing from 74% to
81%.
The survey includes a question on the use of the German language. Immigrants
were asked what language they mainly spoke in Germany : i) mostly German; ii)
mother tongue ; iii) both.22 The variable German spoken is deﬁned as a dummy,
where 0 denotes that the individual mostly uses his/her mother tongue, and 1 if the
individual speaks either both or mostly German. On average, around 70% of the
individuals in the control group declared they spoke German before the reform, as
opposed to the 63% of those in the treatment group. On average there is no variation
in the use of the German language for those in the control group after implementation
of the new citizenship law, while the proportion of those who regularly speak German
increases to 69% among those in the treatment group.
21In the period covered by our analysis these questions were asked every second year, starting
from 1995.
22This question was included in the surveys for 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005.
16Foreign born respondents were asked whether they read: i) newspapers only from
their country of origin; ii) newspapers mainly from their country of origin; iii) about
half and half - German and country of origin; iv) mostly German newspapers; v) only
German newspapers; vi) not applicable, does not read a newspaper regularly.23 The
variable German newspaper is deﬁned over the range 1-5 and takes the value 1 if the
individual reports reading only home country newspapers or no newspapers, and 5
if she/he reads only German newspapers. Column (4) of Table 2 reports the score
for the two groups before and after the reform. While there is an increase in the
propensity to read German newspapers for both groups after the reform, the increase
is noticeably larger only for those in the treatment group.
In summary, the results suggest an increase in the level of assimilation of foreign
born individuals aﬀected by the transition scheme in the reform, as measured both
by level of social interactions with native Germans and by level of knowledge about
German culture. At the opposite extreme, those immigrants unaﬀected by the reform
display no change in their level of integration.
3.3 Baseline Results
Baseline ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of equation (1) for outcomes related to
socializing with Germans are reported in Table 3. Column (1) reports the estimated
eﬀect of the reform on the probability of visiting Germans in their homes, Visited
Germans, for the speciﬁcation that controls linearly for age. The probability increases
signiﬁcantly, by 9.0 percentage points, as a result of the reform. When controlling for
single year age dummies, the eﬀect of the reform, while slightly smaller (8.2 percentage
points), is still statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect corresponds approximately to one
ﬁfth of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Column (3) of Table 3
reports the eﬀect of the reform on the probability of immigrants receiving Germans
in their home, Visited by Germans. The eﬀect is large and statistically diﬀerent from
zero (11.2 percentage points). The inclusion of single year age dummies does not
aﬀect the magnitude of the eﬀect, which is in line with the results for Visited, as it
corresponds to approximately one fourth of the standard deviation of the dependent
variable. Female respondents display systematically lower levels of interaction with
23In the period covered by our analysis this question is included in the survey every second year,
starting from 1994.
17the local community. The number of years of education is positively correlated to
the level of integration: an additional year of education corresponds to an increase
in the probability of visiting Germans in their homes (being visited by Germans) of
3.7 (2.9) percentage points. It could be argued that the variable Visited by Germans
might be a proxy for the level of acceptance by German citizens. However, if this were
the case, it would be hard to justify the diﬀerential increase between the treatment
and control groups after the reform, as the attitude of native Germans would change
towards all immigrants, irrespective of their treatment status.
Estimates for the outcomes related to the use of the German language are reported
in Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 report the OLS results respectively for
German Spoken and German newspaper when age is included linearly, columns (2)
and (4) report the results when single year age dummies are introduced. When age
is included linearly there is a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reform on the
propensity to speak the German language. However, the coeﬃcient becomes smaller
and not signiﬁcant when single year age dummies are accounted for. It should be
noted, however, that the propensity to speak German does not capture the situations
when German is the language used or the quality of the spoken German. The eﬀect
of the reform on the variable measuring the propensity to read German newspapers is
positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, irrespective of whether age is included
linearly or in single year age dummies. The magnitude of the eﬀect corresponds
approximately to one ﬁfth of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. When
we exclude those who do not read newspapers, the results are in line with those
presented.24 Integration with the German culture is lower among less well educated,
and female respondents.
In summary, our results suggest that the reform has had a large and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on both the level of cultural integration of immigrants and their propensity to
socialize with Germans.25
There are three broad mechanisms through which the citizenship rights of chil-
dren might have aﬀected parental integration. First, parents’ preferences and atti-
tudes towards the host country might change when they realize their descendants
24These results are not reported but available from the authors on request.
25Ordered probit estimates for the German newspapers regressions are in line with the OLS
estimates. Results are available from the authors on request.
18will have more economic opportunities as a result of their new status. Second, immi-
grants might not relish being culturally distant from their oﬀspring and may decide,
therefore, to integrate more with the culture of the host country as they anticipate
their children growing up as German citizens, speaking German and adopting Ger-
man habits. The third mechanism focuses on economic incentives without implying
changes in preferences. Suppose that the future earnings of one’s child depend on the
investment of both child and parent, in the latter case in terms of quality of social
networks and language spoken at home. In this setting, a change in citizenship sta-
tus can be interpreted as a technological shock to the child’s earnings’ function. If
parents are altruistic and care about the future earning power of their children, they
might decide to spend more eﬀort on improving the quality of their social networks




The identiﬁcation assumption relies on the fact that integration trends will be the
same in the absence of the reform for both the treatment and control groups. If
this were not the case, our estimates could be an artifact of these exogenous trends
in the propensity to interact with German born citizens, to speak German, and to
read German newspapers.
In order to check the robustness of our identifying assumption we perform several
tests. First, we acknowledge the possibility that diﬀerences in observed characteristics
might create non-parallel integration dynamics between the treatment and control
group in the absence of the reform. In order to control for this potential bias we
estimate the average eﬀect of the reform on those individuals entitled to apply for
citizenship for their children using a two step procedure (see Abadie (2005) and
Heckman et al. (1997)). First, we estimate the propensity score with a logit model
and compute ﬁtted values for the sample. We then estimate eq. (1) by weighted least
squares (WLS) for those observations for which the common support assumption
holds. Results for this speciﬁcation are presented in Table 5. The coeﬃcients are in
19line with those discussed above. As before, the eﬀect of the reform on the propensity
to speak German is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Second, we test whether diﬀerences in time trends driven by unobservable charac-
teristics can potentially bias our results. For this purpose, we perform the following
falsiﬁcation exercise. After restricting the sample to the pre-1999 survey results, we
assume that the reform was implemented in a year x prior to 1999 and we estimate
the same speciﬁcation as in eq. (1). In other words, we compare the integration
outcomes of the treatment and control groups before and after such year x. If our
results are artiﬁcially generated by non-parallel trends in the integration outcomes of
the treatment and control group, we would expect the diﬀerence between the level of
integration of the treatment and the control group to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent after
the “placebo” reform. The results reported in the top panel of Table 6 (Placebo
I) were obtained assuming that the reform was implemented in 1997. Reassuringly,
the coeﬃcients are much smaller than our baseline coeﬃcients and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
Parents in the treatment group have on average younger children than those in the
control group. The previous falsiﬁcation test does not fully control for the possibility
that our results are driven by a non-linear relationship between degree of parental
integration and age of their children. In order to rule this out, we perform a falsi-
ﬁcation test similar to the one discussed above. Foreign citizen parents resident in
Germany for at least 8 years when the youngest child was born, between 1988 and
1997, now become the treatment group. The control group includes all foreign citizen
parents whose youngest child was born between 1978 and 1987 or whose residency
in Germany was less than 8 years when the youngest child was born between 1988
and 1997. The age structure of the children of individuals belonging to the ﬁctitious
treatment (control) group is the same as in the treatment (control) group in the main
speciﬁcation presented in Section 3.3. We then consider only the surveys prior to
1999, assume the reform was passed in 1997 and estimate the speciﬁcation in eq.
(1). If the results in our main speciﬁcation are capturing a bias due to a relationship
between level of parental integration and the age of their children, we would expect
β3 to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The results in the bottom panel of Table 6
(Placebo II) show that the coeﬃcients of interest are negative and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. For both falsiﬁcation exercises the results are robust to choosing
20alternative reference years.
The results in this subsection suggest that in the absence of the reform the treat-
ment and control groups would not display diﬀerential integration trends, due to
either observable or unobservable characteristics.
4.2 Attrition
The validity of our results might be aﬀected by the possibility that individuals exit the
sample in a non-random way. In particular, the reform we study might have aﬀected
diﬀerentially the probability of leaving the sample of individuals in the treatment
and control groups, in which case our estimates might be capturing the eﬀect of the
reform on the composition of the sample rather than on the level of integration of the
respondents.
In our case, there are two potential sources of sample attrition that might be
relevant. First, foreign born parents might leave the sample because they become
naturalized citizens. Second, they might return to their home countries. A priori, it
is not clear in which direction the overall attrition bias would aﬀect our results. In
fact, while it is more likely that only the most integrated immigrants might apply
for and obtain naturalization, the decision to return home might be aﬀected by the
diﬃculty to integrate within German society.
Since our data contain information on the naturalization year of foreign born
individuals, we can measure sample attrition separately for naturalization and other
reasons, return migration, in our view being the most important for our analysis.
On average, around 1.4% of the individuals in our sample made the transition from
non-citizen to citizen status. While there is an overall increase in the probability
of becoming citizen after the reform, the diﬀerence between the treatment and the
control group is close to zero and does not signiﬁcantly change after the reform. The
size of the attrition related to the naturalization of the respondent is thus negligible
and does not diﬀer between the two groups.
Before the reform, on average around 11% of individuals leave the sample for
reasons other than award of German citizenship. Our measure is in line with that in
other works that document sample attrition for immigrants in GSOEP (see Bellemare
(2007)). Consistent with the age diﬀerence documented above, the level of attrition
21is higher for the control group (15%) than the treatment group (7.3%). Reassuringly
the diﬀerence in the attrition rate of the two groups is constant over time and does
not change after the reform. We interpret this result as evidence that the reform
does not determine any diﬀerential variation in the probability of leaving the sample
between treatment and control groups.
There could be some concern that the diﬀerent attrition rate might determine
non-parallel trends between the treatment and control groups. While the falsiﬁcation
tests performed in the previous section provide strong evidence against this possibility,
it should be stressed that any sample selection related to return migration would
potentially determine a downward biased estimate of the eﬀect of the reform. In
fact, under the assumption that return migration is negatively correlated with the
level of integration of the respondent, the higher attrition rate in the control group
would make the least integrated individuals in the control group more likely to exit
the sample than those in the treatment group.
In order to rule out any residual doubt related to sample attrition biases, we
present the results from two further speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we restrict
the sample to respondents interviewed both before and after the reform. In the
second speciﬁcation, in order to control for time invariant unobserved characteristics
that could be correlated with integration outcomes and the propensity to leave the
sample, we control for individual ﬁxed eﬀects.26 Results from the two speciﬁcations
are reported in Table 7; in both cases estimates are very similar to our baseline results.
For three out of our four outcomes, the estimated coeﬃcient of interest is slightly
higher than the coeﬃcient in the main speciﬁcation. This result is not surprising
since, as discussed above, our main source of sample attrition - return migration -
should determine a downward biased estimate in our results.
4.3 Other Provisions of the Reform
The results of the analysis in this paper show that children’s citizenship rights have
a positive impact on parental integration into the adopted home country, in this case
26In the main speciﬁcations we opted to ignore the panel dimension for the following reasons: (i)
because the estimates based on the repeated cross sections are more conservative; (ii) because we
can exploit variations in the treatment status over a larger set of individuals; and (iii) the strict
exogeneity assumption required for the consistency of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator might not necessarily
hold.
22Germany, as measured by the propensity to speak the language (German), read the
national newspapers and interact with Germans. However, the other provisions of
the reform relating to the naturalization of immigrants might also have an eﬀect on
their integration. Thus, part of the eﬀect could be due to these provisions.
Before the reform, foreigners between 16 and 23 years of age with 8 or more years
of residency, and foreigners over the age of 23 with a minimum of 15 years residence,
had a legal claim to naturalization. The citizenship law approved in 1999 and which
came into force at the beginning of 2000, establishes a minimum residency requirement
of 8 years without any age restriction. However, it imposes certain requirements for
naturalization: expressing loyalty to the German Constitution, being able to support
oneself and one’s family without receipt of social security or unemployment beneﬁt, a
clean criminal record, adequate command of the German language, and renunciation
of previous citizenship.
On the one hand, the seeming more lenient residency requirements might encour-
age higher levels of integration among immigrants - particularly within the treated
group; on the other hand, the response of immigrants to the additional requirements
introduced by the law might have been an increased frequency of interactions with
German individuals, and increased interest in learning more about German culture
and language in order especially to meet the new language requirements for natural-
ization. This might bias our results if the number of respondents in the treated group
that plan to apply for naturalization is larger than the number in the control group.
As shown in the previous section, very few individuals in our sample apply for
naturalization, and the proportions of individuals who applied for naturalization in
the control and treatment groups do not vary signiﬁcantly before and after the reform.
Thus, it seems unlikely that our results are driven by a diﬀerential eﬀort to meet the
new citizenship requirements. However, in order to check whether the results of our
analysis capture the eﬀects of other of the reform provisions, we restrict our sample
to respondents who in 2000 had been resident in Germany for 15 years or more.
Individuals in this restricted sample are not aﬀected by the changes in the residency
requirements, while the way how they are inﬂuenced by the additional conditions does
not depend on whether they belong to the treatment or control group. The results
for this restricted sample are presented in Table 8: the coeﬃcients of our variables
of interest remain positive, of similar size and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, even
23though the variable for visiting Germans in their own homes is no longer signiﬁcant.
5 Heterogeneous Eﬀects
In this section we analyze whether the reform has heterogeneous eﬀects, which aﬀect
diﬀerent nationalities and individuals with diﬀerent levels of education in diﬀerent
ways.
Since the signing in 1961 of a bilateral agreement with Turkey for the recruitment
of guest workers, Germany has seen continuous growth in its Turkish immigrant com-
munity that now accounts for about one third of the total immigrant population in
Germany. A variety of studies, however, document the lack of integration of the
Turkish community with the native population. According to Mueller (2006), the
rate of exogamy among Turks living in Germany is impressively low. In 1995, 98% of
married Turkish women and 95% of all married Turkish men had partners of the same
nationality. Moreover, the very small fraction of mixed marriages between German
and Turkish spouses proved to be dramatically unsuccessful: Turkish and German
couples had the highest divorce rates compared to Germans who married Italian,
Greek, Yugoslav or Spanish persons.27 Marginalization seems to aﬀect younger gen-
erations as well. Linguistic deﬁciencies and poor educational performance of young
Turks have been extensively discussed by Sohn and Ozcan (2006); Der Spiegel (24th
February 2002) reports that four out of ﬁve ﬁrst graders have no knowledge at all of
the German language. In our sample only 64% of the Turkish people in our sample
speak either mostly German or German and their native language in equal amounts,
versus an average 72% among other minorities. Similar patterns are observed for the
other measures of integration employed in this paper.
Analysis of whether the eﬀect of the reform varies according to whether the im-
migrant is of Turkish origin or not, helps to explain whether the level of integration
of the immigrant community of origin plays a role in the way that foreign parents re-
spond to the introduction of the jus soli system. We split the sample into two groups,
Turkish and non-Turkish respondents, and estimate the model in eq. (1) using each
27The Berlin Institute for Population and Development classiﬁes migrants with a Turkish back-
ground as the least integrated ethnic group when using the IMI (“Integration Measurement Index”),
a complex index based on 20 diﬀerent indicators that are supposed to capture the performance of
each group in terms assimilation, social security, education and labor outcomes.
24of the two subsamples. The results in top panel of Table 9 show that the eﬀect of the
reform on the level of interaction with the local community is independent of whether
or not the respondent belongs to the Turkish group, but that the reform increased the
propensity to speak German and read German newspapers only among non-Turkish
immigrants.
As a second step, we study whether the levels of education shape the inﬂuence
of the reform on the level and the nature of integration of immigrants. We split the
sample into two subsamples according to number of years of education: 9 or fewer
years of education, and more than 9 years of education.28 When we estimate eq.
(1) using each of the two subsamples, we ﬁnd that diﬀerent levels of human capital
promote diﬀerent patterns of integration as a result of the reform: less well educated
respondents show an increased level of interaction with the local community while
the better educated respondents show a greater level of integration with the local
culture. This ﬁnding is in line with previous evidence. Chiswick (2008) suggests that
education might increase the eﬃciency of acquisition of the second country language,
and other things being equal, those with more schooling are more proﬁcient at the
second language. This might be because those with higher levels of schooling are
more eﬃcient learners, either inherently (due to their higher abilities) or because
they acquire learning skills in school.
In section 3.3 we identify diﬀerent channels through which the introduction of the
jus soli system might aﬀect parental outcomes. Our data do not allow us to test to
what extent changes in preferences and incentives aﬀect the propensity to integrate.
In this section we provide evidence suggesting that the eﬀect of the reform on the
level of integration varies with the initial level of integration of the group to which
the respondent belongs and the initial endowment of human capital.
6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the debate on the eﬀects of migration policy, focusing on
the levels of integration of immigrants. We study how the introduction of elements
of jus soli in the jus sanguinis German system had an eﬀect on the acquisition by
28For most of the immigrants in the sample 9 years represent the minimum requirement to complete
the lower level of secondary education in their country of origin.
25immigrants of the German language and on their social networks. Our results show
that the introduction of the jus soli system determines a signiﬁcant increase in the
integration of the adults. Parents of children aﬀected by the reform are more likely
to read German newspapers and have social interactions with native Germans.
The information available on the respondents in our samples do not allow us to
identify the exact mechanisms behind our ﬁndings. However, this study represents
a ﬁrst attempt to understand the causal link between citizenship status and immi-
grant integration and, although more evidence is needed, we can derive some policy
implications. In particular, our ﬁndings help to explain why some countries are more
successful than others in assimilating immigrants into their cultures and habits, and
should provide some guidance on the instruments and frameworks that should be
adopted in order to deal with the increased levels of diversity in Western societies.
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Note: The ﬁnal sample consists of 1681 observations in 44 countries and it
has been obtained by merging the 2005-2008 wave of the World Value Survey
with the dataset compiled by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) on the evolution of
citizenship laws in the postwar period. Country classiﬁcation is based according
to the system that regulates citizenship at birth in 2001. The sample includes
















1999 2000 2001 2002
by Year
Fraction of Naturalizations
Born between 1990−1999 Born between 1980−1989
Note: The graph plots the ratio of naturalizations by birth cohort over the
total number of naturalizations for each year in the time period between 1999
and 2002. Data from the German Statical Oﬃce.
31Table 1: Individual Characteristics: Descriptives
Treatment Control Diﬀ Diﬀ
Group Group with Age F.E
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 34.602 41.562 -6.960***
(5.052) (4.953) (0.619)
Male 0.456 0.362 0.094 0.098
(0.500) (0.483) (0.061) (0.081)
Married 0.959 0.895 0.064 0.076
(0.199) (0.308) (0.034) (0.044)
Head of Household 0.515 0.429 0.086 0.036
(0.501) (0.497) (0.062) (0.081)
Years of Education 9.640 9.238 0.402 0.009
(1.640) (1.914) (0.225) (0.309)
Number of children 2.456 2.610 -0.153 0.364
(1.102) (1.061) (0.133) (0.203)
Years in Germany 20.509 22.038 -1.529 1.046
(7.645) (7.573) (0.942) (1.133)
Annual Labor Inc. 15230.039 17038.326 -1808.287 -1176.774
(18052.692) (13386.826) (1900.355) (2551.502)
Note: Sample characteristics as reported in the 1999 wave. The Treatment and the Control
groups are deﬁned at household level. The Treatment group includes all foreign born couples
who had resided in Germany for at least 8 years when the youngest child was born between 1st
January 1990 and 31st December 1999. The Control group includes foreign born couples who
had resided for less than 8 years when the youngest child was born between 1990 and 1999 and
those whose youngest child was born between 1980 and 1989. Annual Labor Inc. is expressed in
Euros.
32Table 2: Integration Outcomes: Descriptives
Visited Visited by German German
Germans (d) Germans (d) Spoken (d) News. (1-5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before the Reform
Control Group 0.776 0.815 0.701 2.723
Treatment Group 0.691 0.739 0.633 2.609
Total 0.73 0.77 0.67 2.67
After the Reform
Control Group 0.777 0.819 0.697 2.906
Treatment Group 0.724 0.811 0.691 2.895
Total 0.75 0.81 0.69 2.9
Note: The variable German newspaper varies over the range 1-5 and takes the value 1 if the
individual only reads newspapers from the country of origin or does not read any newspapers,
and takes the value 5 for reading only German newspapers. All the others are dummy variables.
The Treatment group includes all foreign born couples who had resided in Germany for at least
8 years when the youngest child was born between 1st January 1990 and 31st December 1999.
The Control group includes foreign born couples who had resided for less than 8 years when
the youngest child was born between 1990 and 1999 and those whose youngest child was born
between 1980 and 1989.
33Table 3: Baseline results: Network
Visited Visited
Germans by Germans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Group -0.051 -0.039 -0.054 -0.049
(0.042) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041)
Treatment Group*After 0.090** 0.082* 0.112*** 0.111**
(0.042) (0.049) (0.041) (0.046)
Female -0.066* -0.059 -0.046 -0.038
(0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Years of Education 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Orig. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 1804 1804 1803 1803
Clusters 556 556 556 556
R2 0.105 0.119 0.091 0.107
Note: Additional regressors include marital status, household head status, number of children,
the number of years spent in Germany and the household income deciles. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. * signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 4: Baseline results: Language
German German
Spoken Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Group -0.073* -0.055 -0.031 0.004
(0.040) (0.041) (0.099) (0.106)
Treatment Group*After 0.081** 0.044 0.292*** 0.242**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.107) (0.118)
Female 0.002 -0.002 -0.058 -0.066
(0.039) (0.040) (0.098) (0.100)
Years of Education 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.113*** 0.114***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Orig. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2508 2508 2110 2110
Clusters 541 541 597 597
R2 0.147 0.16 0.253 0.264
Note: Additional regressors include marital status, household head status, number of children,
the number of years spent in Germany and the household income deciles. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. * signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
34Table 5: Semiparametric DD
Visited Visited German German
Germans by Germans Spoken Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Group -0.013 -0.034 -0.058 -0.043
(0.049) (0.045) (0.047) (0.112)
Treatment Group*After 0.086* 0.123** 0.079 0.327**
(0.052) (0.051) (0.049) (0.127)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Orig. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1724 1723 2367 2007
R2 0.126 0.114 0.147 0.27
Note: Additional regressors include gender, marital status, household head status, years of
education, number of children, the number of years spent in Germany and household income
deciles. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 6: Falsiﬁcation Tests
Visited Visited German German
Germans by Germans Spoken Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo I
Placebo -0.057 -0.013 0.015 -0.080
(0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.139)
Observations 657 657 983 971
Placebo II
Placebo -0.078 -0.092 -0.009 -0.175
(0.066) (0.058) (0.065) (0.153)
Observations 574 575 819 853
Note: In both tests the placebo reform is in 1997. All regressions control for survey year,
country of origin and single year age dummies. Additional regressors include gender, marital
status, head of household status, years of education, number of children, the number of years
spent in Germany and household income deciles. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. * signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
35Table 7: Sample Attrition
Visited Visited German German
Germans by Germans Spoken Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Restricted Sample
Treatment Group*After 0.126** 0.109** 0.048 0.312**
(0.058) (0.054) (0.043) (0.144)
Observations 1209 1208 1743 1334
R2 0.145 0.141 0.159 0.257
Individual FE Eﬀects
Treatment Group*After 0.145** 0.106* 0.063 0.323**
(0.064) (0.063) (0.043) (0.145)
Observations 1677 1676 2468 1974
R2 0.555 0.566 0.548 0.633
Note: The restricted sample includes all individuals who have been surveyed at least once before
the reform and once after the reform. All regressions control for survey year, country of origin,
and single year age dummies. Additional regressors include gender, marital status, head of
household status, years of education, number of children, the number of years spent in Germany
and household income deciles. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 8: Other Provisions
Visited Visited German German
Germans by Germans Spoken Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Group -0.021 -0.021 -0.083* -0.079
(0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.120)
Treatment Group*After 0.090 0.098* 0.069 0.378***
(0.058) (0.054) (0.047) (0.142)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Orig. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1321 1320 1775 1531
R2 0.122 0.108 0.121 0.27
Note: The sample is restricted to foreign born individuals who have been in Germany for more
than 15 years. Additional regressors include gender, marital status, head of household status,
years of education, number of children, the number of years spent in Germany and household
income deciles. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * signiﬁcant at the
10% level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
36Table 9: Treatment Heterogeneity
Visited Visited German German
Germans by Germans Spoken Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turkish
Treatment Group*After 0.084 0.095 -0.028 -0.033
(0.075) (0.068) (0.056) (0.153)
Observations 834 832 1147 974
R2 0.124 0.101 0.197 0.211
Non Turkish
Treatment Group*After 0.071 0.113* 0.101* 0.503***
(0.070) (0.067) (0.056) (0.180)
Observations 970 971 1361 1136
R2 0.202 0.214 0.205 0.29
Low Educated
Treatment Group*After 0.139** 0.131* 0.019 0.104
(0.070) (0.067) (0.058) (0.163)
Observations 1060 1058 1444 1229
R2 0.139 0.129 0.135 0.241
High Educated
Treatment Group*After -0.040 0.032 0.089 0.342*
(0.068) (0.060) (0.065) (0.182)
Observations 744 745 1064 881
R2 0.171 0.168 0.212 0.304
Note: Individual are classiﬁed as Low Educated if they have completed 9 or less years of formal
schooling. They are classiﬁed as High Educated if they have completed more than 9 years of
formal schooling. All regressions control for survey year, country of origin and single year age
dummies. Additional regressors include gender, marital status, head of household status, years
of education, number of children, the number of years spent in Germany and household income
deciles. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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